ADMIRALTY-LONGSHOREMAN

INJURED

BY

DEFECTIVE

MA-

CHINERY ON PIER WHILE UNLOADING VESSEL IS PROTECTED BY

WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS. Spann v. Lauritzen

(3d Cir.

1965).
The plaintiff, a longshoreman, was employed by a stevedoring
company engaged in transferring a cargo of nitrate of soda from a
vessel owned by the defendant to a fleet of trucks. The transfer was
accomplished by a large shore-based crane which would lower its
bucket into the ship's hold, pick up a load of nitrate, swing it around
and deposit it into a funnel-shaped hopper located on the pier. The
hopper, which was owned by Lavino Shipping Company, was not
attached to the vessel in any way. The hopper was constructed so
that trucks could drive under it and be loaded. It was the plaintiff's
job to pull down a heavy bar so connected as to cause the floor of the
hopper to open, thereby allowing the nitrate to pour into a waiting
truck below. The capacity of the hopper was eight buckets. Five
buckets of nitrate made a truckload. When a truck was filled the
plaintiff would close the floor of the hopper. The plaintiff was
injured when a load of nitrate was dropped into the emptied hopper
and the floor prematurely opened, causing the horizontal bar to
descend and strike him. The plaintiff brought an action in federal
district court against the defendant shipowner to recover damages
for injuries sustained due to the alleged unseaworthiness of the
vessel and the negligence of the defendant. The federal district
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and
the plaintiff appealed. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the plaintiff was in the service of unloading the vessel
and the hopper had sufficient connection with the vessel to be within
the subject matter of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.
Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965).
The warranty of seaworthiness is an implied warranty that the
ship's gear, hull, appliances, manning and appurtenances are reasonably fit for their intended purposes.1 Accordingly, seaworthiness is
a relative2 standard which varies with the nature of the voyage and
whether the ship is in port or at sea.3 For example, a condition which
1 Mesle v. Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958); Crumady v. The Joacbim
Hendrik Fisser, 249 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1957); Lester v. United States, 234 F.2d 625
(2d Cir. 1956) ; NosRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJuRiEs, §§ 27-48 (1959).
2 Pederson v. Morris & Cimumings Dredging Co., 274 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1960);

Lester v. United States, supra note 1.
8 Ibid.; Hanrahan v. Pacific Transp. Co., 262 F. 951 (2d Cir. 1919).
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would amount to unseaworthiness if the vessel were on a cruise in
the North Atlantic might not render it unseaworthy at all while in
port.'
The shipowner's duty has been said to be an absolute and nondelegable one. 5 Diligence on the part of the shipowner to maintain
a seaworthy ship will not relieve his liability if the injury is in fact
proximately caused by an unseaworthy condition. 6 Also, in an action
based on unseaworthiness, neither assumption of the risk nor contributory negligence 8 is a bar to the plaintiff's recovery although the
latter may operate in mitigation of damages under the maritime
doctrine of comparative negligenceY
The duty of a shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel was originally a duty owed only to members of the crew as incident to the
contract of service, express or implied, between the owner of the ship
and the master or any seaman thereof. 10 In 1946 this duty was extended to cover longshoremen doing the work of seamen by the
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki.11 Sieracki involved a stevedore who was injured while operating a winch aboard the defendant's ship. While cargo was being
lowered into a hold, the shackle supporting the boom controlled by
the plaintiff's winch broke, allowing the boom and tackle to fall and
injure the plaintiff. Liability for unseaworthiness was held to arise
not merely from the seaman's contract but from performance of the
ship's service with the owner's consent.12 The Court in Sieracki said
that the warranty of seaworthiness was essentially a species of
liability without fault and that the plaintiff longshoreman was al4 See Hanrahan v. Pacific Transp. Co., rupra note 3; Cf. M'lanahan v. Universal Ins.
Co., 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 170 (1828).
5 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Carlisle Packing Co. v.
Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922) ; Dixon v. United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955).
6 Ibid.
7 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); Ballwanz v. Ithmian
Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1963); Klimaszewski v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co.,
246 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1957).
8 United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Palermo v. Luckenback S.S.,
Inc., 355 U.S. 20 (1957); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953);
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, supra note 7.
9 "The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence wholly

barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible with modern ad.
miralty policy and practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admiralty has developed
and now follows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such consideration
of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires." Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, supra note 8, at 408-09.
10 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
11 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
12 Id. at 97.
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lowed to recover "because he is doing a seaman's work and incurring
a seaman's hazards."' 3
Since Sieracki, the Supreme Court has held that labels such as
"longshoreman" and "stevedore" are not the criteria for protection
under the warranty of seaworthiness. The Court has focused on the
type of work performed by the individual and his relation to the
ship.14 The fact that defective gear was supplied by a stevedore does
not relieve the shipowner from liability,' 5 and it is immaterial
whether the injury occurred on the ship or on land.' 6 However,
recovery has been denied where the plaintiff was injured while performing work not traditionally done by the ship's crew and where
the ship8 involved was not in maritime service at the time of the
injury.'

In ascertaining the scope of the seaworthiness doctrine, a definite
conflict among the circuit courts is evident. The Sixth Circuit, in
McKnight v. N. Mt. Patterson & Sons,'" denied recovery to a longshoreman injured by a shore-based crane while working in one of the
ship's holds, stating that the longshoreman was doing a seaman's
work but not incurring a seaman's hazards. In McKnight the court
held that since none of the traditional unloading gear of the ship was
involved in the plaintiff's work, his injury was not within the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.2
Id. at 99.
14 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
IS Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Rogers v. United States Lines,
347 U.S. 984 (1954).
16 Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
17 United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959). The plaintiff here was an
electrician hired to dean the ship's generators with carbon tetrachloride during the
vessel's annual overhaul. The plaintiff's employer was a subcontractor for the electrical
work. The plaintiff became sick and died two weeks later of carbon tetrachloride
poisoning. But see Shields and Byrne, Application of the Unseaworthiness Doctrine to
Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 1137 (1963); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness
and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954), which voiced doubt
that loading and unloading operations are the traditional work of seamen.
18 West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959). The plaintiff here was an employee
of a contractor which was engaged in activating a ship which had been in the "mothball fleet" for several years. The plaintiff was injured when struck by an end plug from
a water pipe which was propelled through a cylinder of the main engine. The plug
had been loosely fitted on an overhead pipe and was forced off when one of the plaintiff's fellow employees turned on the water without warning. The Court held that the
sole purpose of the work aboard the vessel was to make her seaworthy and that it would
thus be a contradiction to say that the defendant warranted her seaworthiness at the
time of the plaintiff's injury.
19 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960).
20 Id. at 251. Due to the size and purpose of the crane, the federal district court
refused to rule that the ship might adopt or integrate the crane as part of its gear. This
holding was affirmed on appeal.
13
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The Second Circuit, in Forkin v. Furness-Withy b"Co., 21 denied
recovery to a longshoreman injured while attaching a portable conveyor to the ship. The court ruled that the conveyor was not an
appurtenance of the ship and not within the shipowner's warranty of
seaworthiness because the conveyor was not attached to the ship in
any manner when the plaintiff sustained his injury.22
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, in Huff v. Matson Nay. Co. 23 (cited
with approval in the principal case) ,24 allowed recovery to a longshoreman injured in the hold of a vessel by a scraper device which
was part of the stevedore's shore-based crane. Although the scraper
device was attached in a manner25 to the hold, the court declined to
base its holding on this point. The decision in Huff made no distinction as to whether the equipment causing the injury was or was not
physically annexed to the ship.
The factual situation presented in Spann differs from those previously considered by the courts. Here, neither the longshoreman nor
the alleged unseaworthy equipment was aboard the ship at the time
of the injury. In Spann the injury was caused by an alleged unseaworthy condition which both originated and terminated on the pier.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was engaged in unloading the vessel, an activity which is considered to be
typical seamen's work sufficient to bring the activity within the warranty of seaworthiness. 2 The trial court had held that the plaintiff
was engaged in loading the trucks because the unloading of the ship
ended when the nitrate was deposited in the hopper. Consequently,
the plaintiff was not engaged in a seaman's activity and was not
protected by the warranty. The court of appeals, however, noted
that the hopper had to be emptied repeatedly in order to make room
for the crane to dump subsequent loads which it had removed from
the vessel. It remarked, further, that had longshoremen been engaged
in removing the loads from the crane and moving them to another
position on the pier, they would clearly have been within the protec21
22
23

323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 641.
338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1965).

24 344 F.2d at 209.
25 The scraper device was attached to falls which were in turn run through blocks
attached to the sides of the cargo hold. The scraper device was used to drag the cargo,
sugar in this case, to a conveyor located in a leg of the shore-based crane. "The
scrapers, falls and blocks are component parts of and attached to the crane." Id. at 207.
26 Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964); Hagans v. Ellerman Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963); Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser
S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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tion of the warranty of seaworthiness. Thus, the court stated that a
longshoreman is no less within the warranty:
[B]ecause modern ingenuity suggested the desirability of combining the unloading of the vessel with the loading of the trucks....
The labor saving method here used which facilitated the removal
of the cargo by motor vehicles may not be held to eliminate the
unloading of the cargo from the area of traditional work of the
seamen in the service of the vessel .... It has frequently been said
that the doctrine of unseaworthiness is not to be rigidly construed
so as to exclude from its scope modern labor saving methods and the
use of modem machinery to do the work traditionally done in
27
loading or unloading vessels.
The court was not persuaded by the argument that the size and

nature of the hopper prevented it from being included as an appurtenance of the vessel. The court found that the hopper was as
much an essential part of the unloading process as was the crane
since, under the circumstances, the cargo could not have been unloaded without it. Furthermore, the court stated: "That some other
method might have been used does not eliminate the means used
for the unloading of the cargo as a part of the appurtenances of the
28
vessel."
Although there have been prior cases extending the scope of the
doctrine to injuries occurring off the vessel, they are distinguishable
from Spann. In Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp.29 the injury to the
plaintiff was due to defective cargo containers which had been stored
on board the vessel. The longshoreman was injured when he slipped
on beans which had spilled onto the pier from the defective containers. The Court held that under the Admiralty Extension Act of
1948,0 the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness extended to cargo
containers and applied to longshoremen while unloading the ship,
whether they were aboard ship or on the pier. 1 Similarly, Hagans v.
Ellerman &4Bucknall S.S. Co. 32 involved an injury to a longshoreman
who slipped and fell on sand which had spilled from burst bags
unloaded from the vessel. The court held that the plaintiff, though
27
28
29

344 F.2d at 206.

Id. at 209.

373 U.S. 206 (1963).

80 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740. "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of
the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or

injury be done or consummated on land."
31 373 U.S. at 215.
82 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963).
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working on the pier, was within the coverage of the warranty of
seaworthiness because he was engaged in unloading the bags from
the vessel and was injured by a condition created by the defective
bags. 83 These cases are distinguishable from Spann because the unseaworthy conditions in Gutierrez and Hagans emanated from the
vessel. This distinction appears to be within the limits of the Admiralty Extension Act that the damage or injury be "caused by a
vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or
injury be done or consummated on land."8 4
In aiding the harbor worker to join the seaman as a favored ward"
of admiralty law, Spann states that the purpose of the seaworthiness
doctrine is to protect those "in the service of the vessel."8" The test
applied is whether the risk incurred in the particular case falls
within the hazard of such service. 7 As the test is applied in Spann,
once the plaintiff's activities can be placed within the service of the
vessel, then it need only be determined that the equipment was
"essential" to his job in order to establish it as an appurtenance of
the vessel.8 8 Practically any equipment can in some way be considered
38 Id. at 571.
34

62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740.

85 It is interesting to note that the plaintiff in Spann had three means of recovery

available for the redress of his injuries. First, he had a statutory cause of action against
his employer for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.
44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 99 901-50. Second, since the allegedly defective
hopper was owned by a third party to the action, plaintiff had and has brought an
action against Lavino Shipping Co. Spann v. Lavino Shipping Co., No. 5994, C.P.,
Phila., March term 1965. Remaining is the action for unseaworthiness against the ship.
owner. Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act the employee may bring
an action against an allegedly liable third person notwithstanding the fact that the
employee has accepted compensation if said action is brought within six months. 73
Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. H9 933(a),(b). After six months the employee is said to
have assigned whatever rights he possessed against a third party to his employer. 73
Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(b). If the employer then recovers from the third
party he must pass this recovery on to the employee less certain authorized deductions.
73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(e). Furthermore, if the employee proceeds
against the third party and receives less than he would have been allowed under the
statute, his employer is then obligated to make up this difference through compensation. 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(f). The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act thus is designed to provide the employee with compensation or damages,
whichever is greater. In addition, some courts have held that under certain circum.
stances the employee may still bring action against a third party despite the fact that
the six month statutory period has passed and compensation has been received. Castro
v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 967 (D.P.R. 1964); Wynn v. Kelley, 233 F. Supp. 875
(D.D.C. 1963). Thus, it becomes apparent that the plaintiff in Spann would not be
forced to bear the burden of his injuries alone even if deprived of his action for unseaworthiness against the shipowner.
86 344 F.2d at 207.
37 Ibid.
38 Id. at 208.
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"essential" to a workman utilizing it in the service of a vessel regardless of its individual function or duty. Thus, the test set forth in
Spann would seem to establish the shipowner as an insurer of all
equipment utilized by individuals considered to be in the service of
the vessel.
JOHN D. DUNBAR

